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Communist China's Trade
Treaties and Agreements
(1949-1964)
Gene T. Hsiao*
Utilizing material gathered by extensive research, the author examines
Communist China's trade treaties and agreements, with some emphasis
upon their economic and political implications. Also, he analyzes the
Communist Chinese use of establishment provisions and national and
most-favored-nation treatment. The author has selected the period
from 1949 to 1964 due to the existence of an official collection of
treaties compiled by the Peking government for this period. Although
the collection has not been available since 1964, the authors examination of secondary official source materials has revealed no significant
change in the regime's attitude, and therefore, the materials contained
in the official collection are considered representative of the present
attitudes of the People's Republic of China.

I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a
socialist power brought with it a system of state monopoly of foreign
trade.' In place of private import and export business, the Peking
*LL.B., Kwang Hua, 1946; M.A., LL.M., University of California, Berkeley, 1960,
1962. Associate Specialist in the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California,
Berkeley; concurrently a member of the University's Project on Comparative Study of
Communist Societies. This is the second of a series of articles on the legal aspects of
Communist China's foreign trade. The author is grateful to the Chancellor's Program
Committee for International Studies, the Institute of International Studies, the Center
for Chinese Studies, the Project on Comparative Study of Communist Societies, and
the School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, for their support of his undertaking. He is also thankful to all those in Hong Kong and Japan who assisted him
in this study.
1. In Soviet Russia, foreign trade was nationalized by a decree on April 22, 1918.
& KozaRA, MATEmuALS FoR THE STUDY OF Tim Sov=r SYsTFNr 70-72 (1953).
The PRC did not take such a measure. Its first constitution, known as the CoMMON
PnocnAm art. 37 (1949), provides for "the control of foreign trade" by the state.
MEISEL
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crees of the Central People's Government)
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regime established sixteen national corporations under the Ministry of
Foreign Trade to carry out international commerce. The regime also
established an extensive network of licensing bureaus, customs offices,
commodity inspection administrations, state banks, state insurance
companies, and arbitration organs.2 Trade treaties and agreements,
being a conventional legal medium of international commerce, became at once an important instrument to fulfill the regime's economic
and political needs.
Economically, there are five points to be mentioned. First, the
PRG's foreign trade is part and parcel of its planned economy. 3 The
planner, however, cannot make plans on the basis of his imagination;
he needs to know the sources of purchase and supply and other related
information to compile the foreign trade plan in order to link itwith
other economic plans, especially with the production plan.4 A longterm trade agreement, or even a relatively short-term trade agreement
or contract, meets the planning needs. 5 Secondly, unlike the domestic
market, international commerce is not subject to the regime's control.
A trade agreement legally assures the regime of the sources of purchase and supply for the fulfillment of plans. Moreover, it provides
the regime with an opportunity to negotiate prices that will remain
fixed for a period of time to come; 6 this practice, primarily designed
to free the contracting parties from "being influenced by the supply
and demand of the capitalist market and its sharp price fluctuations,"
in turn provides an element of stability for planning.7 Thirdly, consummation of a trade agreement can normalize the economic relations
of the contracting states and promote their trade. From Peking's point
FLHP]. Its second constitution (1954) does not prescribe the function of the Ministry of Foreign Trade at all. In practice, the state monopoly of foreign trade, like that
of domestic commerce, was carried out through a gradual process. For a discussion,
see note 2 infra.
2. Hsiao, Communist Chinas Foreign Trade Organization, 20 VAND. L. REV. 303
(1967).
3. See First Five Years Plan for the Development of the National Economy (19531957), 2 CHuNG-HU A JEN-mm Kurc-Ho-xuo FA-xm HUI-PIEN (Compilation of the
Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China) 131, 230-31 (1955) [hereinafter cited as FKHP].
4. Yeh Chi-chuang, Address to the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 3 MnmTRYx
OF FOnEIGN TAADE, Tux-wM MAo-i LUN-WEN HSUAN (Selection of Essays on Foreign Trade) 5-9 (1957) [hereinafter cited as EssAys].
5. Chao Chi-ch'ang, Overall Planning of Foreign Trade and Conclusion of Long.
Term Trade Agreements, 2 EssAYs 151-55 (1956).
6. For references to the regime's policy of international price formation, see Yeh
Chi-chuang, address to the Fourth Session of the First National People's Congress,
July 11, 1957, in 1958 JEN-MN SsOu-Ts'E (The People's Handbook) 557-59 [hereinafter cited as JMST].
7. See note 6 supra; Tsou Szu-I, The Efforts Made by China in the Execution of
the Afro-Asian Conference's Resolution on Economic Cooperation, 2 EssAYs 80-85.
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of view, such agreements, based on the principle of most-favorednation treatment, are particularly "necessary" in transactions with
capitalist countries, not only for the purposes stated above, but also
because they can provide a legal safeguard against discrimination
under the conditions of "monopoly capitalism" in international commerce and thereby protect the independence of the socialist economy."
Fourthly, in relations with socialist countries, the trade treaties and
agreements concluded under the system of state monopoly of foreign
trade are considered a means to coordinate the development of the
planned economies on the basis of "equality, mutual benefit, mutual
respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-intervention in internal affairs."9 Finally, in relations with Afro-Asian and
Latin American countries, trade agreements are generally accompanied by aid programs to facilitate the achievement of their political
independence. Indeed, leaders of the PRC firmly believe that without genuine economic independence, true political independence is
impossible. 10
National sovereignty is, of course, a distinctive element of international trade;' however, Peking's foreign trade policy objective
clearly does not limit itself to the protection of the regime's commercial interests at home and abroad. It extends over to the regime's
struggle for diplomatic recognition and the expansion of its sphere
of political influence overseas. Trade treaties and agreements, in this
connection, become a convenient vehicle to promote the regime's
diplomatic interests.
Early on September 28, 1953, in an interview with Japanese "peace"
promoter Ikuo Oyama, Premier Chou En-lai approved the former's
suggestion that the lack of diplomatic relations between Japan and
the PRC should not impede the cultural and economic exchange
between the two peoples. 12 Later, citing the PRC's 1952 and 1955
trade agreements with Ceylon and Egypt respectively as examples,
8. WANG YAO-T'iEN, Kuio-cm MAO-I T'VAo-Y tEH Ho HSIm-TING (International Trade
Treaties and Agreements) 114-18 (1958) [hereinafter cited as WANG YAO-T'IEN].
This work is an official textbook of the Peking Foreign Trade Institute.
9. Chi Chao-ting, Two Types of International Economic Relations, in 2 EssAYs
29-34; Yeh Chi-chuang, Our Country's Foreign Trade In the Past Ten Years, 1960
JMST 91-93.
10. Mao Tse-tung, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, SiLEarE
Wonxs
1473, 1478 (1966); Chou En-ai, Address to the Third Session of the First National
People's Congress, June 28, 1956, in 1957 JMST 182, 186; Nan Han-ch'en, Firmly
Carry Out the Struggle Against Imperialism and New Colonialism and Realize the

Economic Liberation of the Afro-Asian People, 1065 JMST 498, 501.
11. R. Ic mm, M. e'AatiJ & F. RooT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11-12 (1959).
12. 2 CHuNC--uA JEN-mm KuNG-Ho- uo Tm-wAx KUAN-Hsr WEN-CHIEI CM (Collection of Documents on the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China)
150-52 (1951-1953) [hereinafter cited as TWKH].
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Chou reiterated that states without diplomatic relations with each
other could still make governmental arrangements. 13 An historical
precedent is seen in Britain's March 16, 1921, trade agreement with
Soviet Russia, which preceded the British government's diplomatic
recognition of the Soviet regime on February 2, 1924.14 As to the
mode of transactions and contractual terms, Minister of Foreign Trade
Yeh Chi-chuang went so far as to declare that "so long as normal
international trade can be restored, we are willing to use methods
generally applicable to regular world commerce." 15 This announcement, which was made to cope with the shortage of imports resulting
from the American embargo, omits any indication of Peking's ideological predilection and political motivation. In reality, as will be seen
later, both ideological and political elements are present in most of
the PRC's trade agreements; the difference is only a matter of degree
and emphasis. It stands to reason that in international trade, law is
not an end in itself, but it is a technique to achieve certain goals
determined by economics and politics. Consequently, the following
legal study of the PRC's foreign trade documents is bound to be
relative.
During the fifteen years and three months-October 1, 1949, to
December 31, 1964-under review,' the PRC concluded 408 bilateral
"economic" treaties and agreements with 48 states out of a total
number of 762 bilateral treaties and agreements which the PRC
reached with 53 states and the United Nations. 17 Although these
official figures are incomplete and arbitrary, 8 they do reflect the
importance of foreign trade in the PRC's treaty practice. According
to Peking's own classification, treaties fall into fourteen major
categories.' 9 Within the economic category, there are six groups:
13. Chou En-lai, supra note 10. Ceylon recognized the PRC on Jan. 6, 1950, but
did not exchange diplomatic representatives with Peking until Sept. 14, 1956. See
the Joint Communiqu6 of the Delegates of the PRC and the Ceylon Governments,
1957 JMST 390. The Egypt case will be discussed later.
14. WANG YAO-T'IEN 17.

15. Yeh Chi-chuang, Working for the Development of Normal International Trade,
2 EssA s 7, 11.
16. Selection of this period is based primarily on the existence of thirteen volumes
of the official collection of treaties, CHUNc-SUA JEN=Min KUNO-HO--UO T'IAO-YUEI CHI
[hereinafter cited as TYC], compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking.
17. This is based on an actual counting of the documents listed in the official
collection, TYC.
18. The incompleteness and arbitrariness chiefly lies in the standard of selection
and classification. Since international law fails to provide a unified nomenclature and
a stable criterion for the classification of treaties, and since the present study is not
a quantitative analysis of the PRC's treaties, it becomes necessary to accept these
official figures for the purpose of illustration.
19. These are: political, legal, border problems, frontier problems, economic,
cultural, scientific and technological, agricultural and forest, fishing, public health,
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(1) commerce and navigation; (2) economic aid, loans and technical
cooperation; (3) trade and payments; (4) general conditions of
delivery; (5) registration of trademarks; and (6) miscellaneous. 2°
While all these documents may be included in the category of trade

treaties and agreements, as defined in the western world, consideration in the present study is limited to their general principles, the
establishment provisions, and the national and most-favored-nation
treatment.2 '
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

As part of treaty law, the PRC's trade treaties and agreements are
closely related to its general treaty theory and practice. Since a
study of the latter's technical aspects has already been made elsewhere,22 the following discussion is focused upon treaty definition and
designation, form, and language, as used in the PRC's trade treaties
and agreements.
A. Treaty Definition and Designation
Borrowing from the writings of F. I. Kozhevnikov, a Soviet jurist,
the Peking Foreign Trade Institute defined a treaty as "a document
between two or more states concerning the creation, modification, or
termination of their sovereign rights and obligations,"2 and "a typical
and most widespread legal form in the realm of political, economic,
and other relations between states."2 On the basis of this general
postal service and tele-communications, communications and transport, rules of war,
and military. See 11 TYC 227-84 (1962).
20. 11 TYC 237-268 (1962). For some general statistical ideas about the PRC's
trade treaty relations with individual states, see tables in appendix, infra.
21. The PRC has four agreements on the registration of trademarks: The United
Kingdom, April 13 and June 1, 1956, in 5 TYC 68; Switzerland, April 14, 1956 and
March 8, 1957, in 6 TYC 178; Sweden, April 6 and 8, 1957, in 6 TYC 180; and
Denmark, March 25 and April 12, 1958, in 7 TYC 37. For a brief discussion of this
problem, see Hsiao, supra note 2, at 317-18. Other problems concerning industrial
property do not appear in the PRC's official collection of treaties and consequently
require separate treatment. The agreements on economic aid, loans, and technical cooperation are distinctly political. Some of the elements related to trade treaties and
agreements will be mentioned at proper places in this article.
22. Chiu, The Theory and Practice of Communist China With Respect to the
Conclusion of Treaties, 5 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L. L. 1 (1966).
23. WANG YA O-T'iEN 9; Kozhevnikov, Nekotorye voprosy teorii i praktiki mezhdunarodnogo dogovora, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 2, 1954, at 62-76, trans. in,
HsmN-Tx Kuo-cm-FA SHANG TE YUAN-TSE Ho WEN-T'i (The Basic Principles and
Problems of Modem International Law), 223 (1956).
24. Id. at 227. In another source, Kozhevnikov is reported to have defined a treaty
as "a typical and most widespread legal form of struggle or cooperation in the realm
of political, economic, and other relations between states." J. TMSKA & R. SLUssER,
ThE THEoRY, LAw, AND Poracy OF SovxET TREAm&rs 38 (1962) (emphasis added).
In the Chinese version of the definition quoted above, the word "struggle" is omitted.
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definition, a trade treaty or agreement is described as "a written
agreement between two or more sovereign states concerning the
regulation of the mutual economic and trade relations of natural and
juristic persons of the contracting states as well as those relations
between the governments of the contracting states themselves."',
From the various treaty designations defined by Soviet jurists, 26
the Chinese enumerated and elaborated upon six: (1) treaty (t'iaoyiieh), a most important international document regulating the
political, economic, or other relations of the contracting states; (2)
agreement (hsieh-ting), a treaty regulating certain special or temporary problems of the contracting states; (3) convention (kungyiieh) or pact (chuan-yiieh), a multilateral agreement concerning
certain specific problems; (4) declaration (hwiian-yen), a general
statement concerning the international relations and the general
principles of international law recognized by the interested states,
sometimes including concrete obligations, such as the 1856 Paris
Declaration on the Abolition of Privateering and the December 1,
1943, Cairo Declaration;27 (5) protocol (I-ting-shu), an agreement
on individual problems, sometimes amending, interpreting, or supplementing certain provisions of a treaty; and (6) exchange of notes
(huan-wen), defining certain matters already agreed upon by the
parties.2
Whereas the omission of other Soviet treaty designations by Chinese
writers does not necessarily mean that the PRC has ignored their
existence or usefulness, the PRC generally has confined its trade
practice to the use of the six titles mentioned above. Thus, of the
408 economic arrangements, seven assumed the title "treaty of trade
and navigation; 29 393 took the titles "agreement," "protocol," and
"exchange of notes"; and the remaining eight took miscellaneous
designations.30 The use of "general conditions of delivery" as a treaty
25. WANG YAO-T'EN 15.

26. These are treaty, convention, agreement, covenant or charter, protocol, exclango
of notes, declaration, gentlemen's agreement, modus vivendi, cartels, concordats, and
compromise. J. TmsKA & R. SLUSSER, supra note 24, at 39-40.
27. Although the Cairo Declaration is not listed in the Department of State's
TREATIES IN FORCE, the PRC has always considered it a treaty. See 3 Kuo-cin
T'rAo-Yumi Cmx (Collection of International Treaties) 407 (1934-1944). This is compiled by Shih-chieh Chih-shih Ch'u-pan-she in Peking.
28. WANG YAO-7r'IEN 12.

29. Albania, Feb. 2, 1961, in 10 TYC 290; the Democratic Republic of Germany,
Jan. 18, 1960, in 9 TYC 134; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Nov. 5,
1962, in 11 TYC 92; the People's Republic of Mongolia, April 26, 1961, in 10 TYC
361; the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), April 23, 1958, in 7 TYC
42; the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Dec. 5, 1962, in 11 TYC 100; and Yemen,
Jan. 12, 1958, in 7 TYC 28.
30. These are: Correspondence Between China and Japan Concerning the Assistance and Support of the Japanese Government to the Sino-Japanese Trade Agree-
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designation was limited to socialist states with the exception of
Finland, which had two such arrangements with the PRC.31 Furthermore, it should be noted that on most occasions, this particular docuand only in a few
ment was designated as an "annex" of a protocol,
32
agreement.
separate
a
as
treated
it
was
cases
B. Form and Language
The PRO's practice suggests that all treaties must be written;
treaties in oral form have not been reported. A formal trade treaty
usually consists of three parts: the preamble states the names of the
contracting parties, the general purpose of the treaty, and the plenipotentiaries empowered to sign the treaty; the main text contains
substantive provisions concerning natural and juristic persons, goods,
vessels, and arbitration; and the concluding part stipulates ratification, entry into force, duration, and the authenticity of languages.
An example of the standard form is the Treaty of Trade and Naviga33
tion Between the PRC and the USSR April 23, 1958.
A trade agreement with a socialist state, sometimes assuming the
form of a protocol, also contains three parts but is less rigid in its
external form and more specific in its content. Since such an agreement is usually signed by authorized representatives of the foreign
trade organizations of the contracting states, the exchange in the
preamble of "full powers" and other formalities is omitted. The main
text deals with such problems as goods, price, payment, currency,
enforcement, and the manner in which tariff duties are to be paid.
The concluding part concerns duration and language. As a matter
of practice, the agreement is usually accompanied by two schedules
of goods for each party to import and export.34 Following the conment, May 4, 1955, in 4 TYC 262; Joint Statement on the Further Promotion of SinoJapanese Trade, Oct. 15, 1956, in 5 TYC 404; Official Letters of the Governmental

Departments of the PRC and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the
Realization of Trade Agreements, August 20, 1956 & Sept. 26, 1957, in 6 TYC 325;

Joint Statement of China and Japan Concerning the Fourth Trade Agreement, Nov. 1,
1957, in 6 TYC 321; Communiqu6 of the Trade Meeting Between the PRC and the

Republic of Sudan, Dec. 30, 1957, in 6 TYC 72; Communiqu6 of the Meeting Between the Economic Delegations of the PRC and Nigeria, June 18, 1961, in 10 TYC
248; Memorandum of Liao Ch'eng-chih and Takasaki, Nov. 9, 1962, in 11 TYC 157;
Summary of the Meeting Minutes of the Offices of Liao Ch'eng-chih and Takasaki
Concerning the Exchange of Representatives and Liaison Offices, April 19, 1964, in

13 TYC 386.
31. 2 TYC 372 (1952-1953); 3 TYC 197 (1964).
32. See, e.g., the General Conditions of Delivery Between the Foreign Trade Organi-

zations of the PRC and Poland for the Year 1951, Feb. 1, 1951, in 1 TYC 64.
33. 7 TYC 42-46 (1958).

For the Russian text and its English and French trans-

lations, see 313 U.N.T.S. 136 (1958).
34. An example of the standard form for this document is the Trade Agreement
with the Government of the USSR, April 19, 1950, in 1 TYC 4749.
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elusion of a trade agreement, a protocol on the general conditions of
delivery is also reached, specifying rules for the form of contracts,
terms of delivery, quantity and quality of goods, packing and marking,
inspection of goods, methods of payment, adjustment of disagreements, penalties, force majeure, and arbitration. The basic function
of the general conditions of delivery is to simplify the procedures
for the making of individual contracts; in essence, it is a general
contract of the Soviet type. The terms of the general conditions of
delivery are binding upon the contracting parties unless otherwise
specified in individual contracts.
So far as language is concerned, the official languages of both contracting parties are equally authentic in the PRC's trade treaties and
agreements with the USSR, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, North
Vietnam, and Cuba.3 7 In trade agreements with all Eastern European
countries except Yugoslavia, the authentic languages are usually the
official languages of the contracting parties and Russian; 38 in the
case of a dispute arising from the interpretation of the languages,
Russian prevails. 9 The PRC's first trade agreement with Yugoslavia,
dated February 17, 1956, accepted both Chinese and Serbo-Croatian
as the authentic language; 40 no reference was made to any third
language. However, in their ten succeeding trade agreements, beginning with the agreement of January 4, 1957,4 1 both parties agreed to
use English as the prevailing language. Since there is no official
35. An outline of these terms is in WANG YAO-T'mN 126-32. For reference to
actual samples, see: Protocol on the General Conditions of Delivery Between the
Foreign Trade Organizations of the PRC and the USSR for the Year 1950, April 19,

1950, in 1 TYC 51-59; and Protocol on the General Conditions of Delivery Between
the Foreign Trade Organizations of the PRC and the Democratic Republic of Germany
for the Year 1958, May 22, 1958, in 7 TYC 144-61.
36. WANG, YAO-T'IEN 127. See also CHMN-MNCN Tui-wAi MAO-i Tz'u-TIEN (Concise Dictionary of Foreign Trade) 72-73 (1959).
37. See, e.g., Protocol on the General Conditions of Delivery with the USSR for the
Year 1957, April 10, 1957, in 6 TYC 77, 78; Treaty of Trade and Navigation with the
USSR, April 23, 1958, in 7 TYC 42, 46; Protocol on the Mutual Supply of Goods
with the People's Republic of Mongolia for the Year 1959, January 30, 1959, in 8 TYC
102, 103; Protocol on the Mutual Supply of Goods with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Year 1960, Feb. 29, 1960, in 9 TYC 121, 123; Agreement on
the Mutual Supply of Goods and Payments with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
for the Year 1959, Feb. 18, 1959, in 8 TYC 104, 105; Trade and Payments Agreement with Cuba, July 23, 1960, in 10 TYC 238, 243.
38. This practice is limited to trade agreements, protocols, and general conditions
of delivery, and does not apply to formal treaties of trade and navigation with socialist
countries.
39. See, e.g., Agreement on the Exchange of Goods and Payments with the Republic
of Czechoslovakia for the Year 1959, March 12, 1959, in 8 TYC 99, 101.
40. 5 TYC 113, 115.
41. 6 TYC 164, 165.
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explanation for the choice, one can only assume that it might be
related to politics, or simply for the purpose of convenience.
Outside the socialist camp, the PRC has only one formal treaty of
commerce, with Yemen (January 12, 1958).4 Thus, in matters concerning commerce and navigation, trade agreements with non-socialist
countries have played a role somewhat different from that of a socialist
trade agreement. Instead of dealing with specific problems, these
non-socialist trade agreements provide such general principles as
"equilibrium" in the volume of trade, most-favored-nation treatment,
the establishment of trade missions, and methods for the settling of
disputes. 43 Trade agreements of this type have two categories. One
is "governmental," concluded with those states which have diplomatic
relations with the PRC. The other is "non-governmental," concluded
between private or semi-governmental organizations of foreign
countries having no diplomatic relations with Peking, on the one hand,
and "non-governmental" associations, such as the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade and state corporations of the PRC,
on the other. Politically, this arrangement is a fiction, because, on
Peking's part, the system of state monopoly of foreign trade simply
does not permit private or non-governmental transactions except in
frontier trade. However, the amount involved in frontier trade is
extremely small; for example, in each frontier transaction with the
North Vietnamese, the amount was limited to ten yuan.44 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking included most of the non-governmental agreements in its official treaty collection, thus giving the
agreements a treaty character. Legally speaking, however, such inclusion is a unilateral act, since the governments of the PRC's private
foreign trade partners are in no way bound by the terms of the agreements. Japan is a case in point. Under the terms of each of the
first three Sino-Japanese trade agreements, the total volume of twoway trade provided for sixty million pounds sterling, 45 but for the
first agreement, the actual transactions only amounted to 5.05 per
cent of the total sum; for the second, 38.8 per cent; and for the third,
75.12 per cent.46 Peking blamed the United States for the Japanese
failure to fulfill the trade obligations but had no legal recourse to
42. 7 TYC 28.
43. See, e.g., Trade Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Syria,
Nov. 30, 1955, in 4 TYC 118; Trade Agreement with the Government of the Republic
of Egypt, August 22, 1955, in 4 TYC 123.
44. Protocol with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Concerning Small Transactions in the Border Areas of the Two Countries, July 7, 1955, in 5 TYC 154, 155.
45. The first agreement, June 1, 1952, in 2 TYC 367; the second, Oct. 29, 1953, in
2 TYC 369; the third, May 4, 1955, in 4 TYC 258.
46. Ts'ao Chung-shu, Perspectivesof Sino-Japanese Trade, 3 EssAYs 94-98.
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force the Japanese government to remedy the situation. 41
In trade agreements with non-socialist states, the official languages
of the contracting parties are equally authentic. This is said to be
based on the principle of "equality." Sometimes, upon the agreement

of the contracting parties, a third language, usually English or French,
48

is also used, either for reference or as the basis of interpretation.
The Treaty of Commerce with Yemen, January 12, 1958, in which
Arabic prevails, is an exception and contrasts with the Trade AgreeChinese, and English
ment with Egypt, August 22, 1955, where Arabic,
49
are all accepted as being equally authentic.

III.

ESTABLISHMENT PROVISIONS

The establishment provisions of modern commercial treaties deal
with the rights of natural and juristic persons of either contracting
state within the boundaries of the other. These include: the right of
entry, residence, and travel; the right to engage in business activities;
the right to own or lease property; and the right of access to the
courts.50 Undoubtedly, such provisions are related to two basic
elements: the role and status of individuals in the state, and the
need for foreign investment.51
In the PRC, which as a socialist state owns all productive property,52 the individuals and corporate bodies carry out business activities on behalf of the state, not on their own. With respect to foreign
investment, the regime is mindful of the privileged status of foreign
investors and capital in China before 1949 and, therefore, has considered it a form of "exploitation." In the early years, the regime
received assistance from the Soviet Union and some other European
socialist countries. But except for a few limited cases of government
47. Lei Jen-min, For An Early Realization of the Normalization of Sino-Japanese
Economic and Trade Relations, 3 EssAYs 87-93.
48. See, e.g., Trade Agreement with the Government of Finland, June 5, 1953, in
2 TYC 35, 37; Trade Agreement with the Government of Syria, Nov. 30, 1955, in
4 TYC 118, 120.
49. 7 TYC 28, 30.
50. E.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the Republic of
China and the United States of America, Nov. 4, 1946, in 25 U.N.T.S. 90 (1949).
51. As one writer observed: "[Olne of the most important functions of establishment provisions is to create conditions favorable to foreign investment, particularly
direct private

investment."

HAwmNs,

COMIIERCIAL TREATFS

AND

AGREEMENTS:

PrmaNCrLEs AND PRAcTcE 19 (1951). For similar observations, see Walker, Modern
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1958),
reproduced in 1 S. ME'ZGER, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRA.DE 24 (1966).
52. For a discussion of the nature of the state and the role of individuals in the
PRC, see Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions Among the
People, 5 FKHP 1 (1957). For reference to the regime's property system, see Hsiao,
The Role of Economic Contracts in Communist China, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1029, 103642 (1965).
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stock corporations, this was in the form of "aid and loans," not
investment. 53 Around 1956, when the socialization of private property
reached its climaxm the regime virtually eliminated all alien commercial interests devolving from its predecessor and declared a policy
of "self-reliance" in which foreign aid was denoted as a secondary
source of support.55 In the ensuing years, this policy gained increasing
momentum as a result of the regime's controversy with Moscow so
that by the spring of 1965 the regime was able to announce that it
had paid off all its debts to the Soviet Union in the amount of
1,406,000,000 new rubles, including interest.m Therefore, now that
the PRC is a nation without foreign debts, except short-term credits,
it operates foreign trade with its own capital and does so on three
levels: individual, corporational, and governmental.
A. Natural and Juristic Persons
In trade treaties, the term "natural persons" is commonly understood to mean "nationals" or "citizens" of the contracting states.
However, since nations often use these words with different meanings,5' it is essential to have an adequate understanding of the
nationality status of the Chinese as interpreted by the PRC's official
literature.5
Generally speaking, there are three categories of Chinese: (1) those
who live under the direct control of the PRC; (2) those who are
under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China in Taiwan; and
(3) those who reside in foreign territories. According to the treaty of
April 22, 1955, with Indonesia, concerning the problem of dual
nationality,5 9 the PRC agreed to offer the Chinese residents in that
country a choice of nationality; if one chose to adopt the nationality
of Indonesia, he lost the nationality of the PRC, and vice versa.60 In
53. "Investment may be summarily defined as the joining of an investor (a person)
and capital (property) into a gainful enterprise (a business activity)." Walker, Treaties
for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States
Practice, 5 Am. J. Coww,. L. 229 (1956), reproduced in 1 S. M'zzEn, supra note 51,
at 50, 53.
54. HsturF Mu-c=iAo, Su HsInG & Lnr TsE-Ls, ThE SOCIALIST TRANsFoRmATIoN OF
THE NATIONAL EcONomy IN CnINA (1960).

55. Yeh Chi-chuang, Our Country's Foreign Trade in the Past Ten Years, 1960
JMST 91-93.
56. Chou En-lai, Report on the Work of Government, in Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking),
Dec. 31, 1964, at 1; Nan Han-ch'en, supra note 10, at 502.
57. The United States, for one, makes a distinction between its "citizens" and
"nationals." See Immigration and Nationality Act tit. III, 8 U.S.C. §1401 (1964).
58. The PRC has not promulgated a nationality law. Consequently, discussion can
only be based on the regime's scattered political and legal materials.
59. 8 TYC 12.
60. For a discussion of this matter, see Hsia, Settlement of Dual Nationality Between
Communist China and Other Countries, Osteuropa-Recht, No. 1, March 1965, at
27-38.
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view of this, the PRC appears to consider all overseas Chinese its
subjects, unless specific agreements have been reached with their
host countries. With respect to the Chinese under the jurisdiction
of the Republic of China, they are treated as citizens of the Republic
of China in countries which either maintain diplomatic relations
with Taipei or accept the defacto "two-China" situation, such as the
United Kingdom. 61 From Peking's point of view, however, this group
of Chinese are also its subjects, and the present situation is essentially
political, not legal.
As regards the Chinese living under the direct control of the
Peking Regime, they are classified into three categories: people
(jen-min), nationals (kuo-min), and citizens (kung-min). The "people" are those who pledge their political allegiance to the regime and
whom the regime considers acceptable in terms of their loyalty and
social class standing.62 Under the COMMON PROGRAM OF 1949, the
"people" enjoy certain political and legal rights. 63 The "nationals"
are those who do not belong to the category of "people;" although, as
members of the Chinese nation, these political outcasts are obligated
those duties required of every Chinese by the state constituto fulfill
tion.64 In other words, the "people" of the PRC are also nationals of
the state, but the "nationals" of the state do not belong to its "people."
Consequently, one may call these nationals "pure nationals." The
legal difference is that certain rights and privileges accorded to the
"people" by the state are not available to the nationals.0
Although the term "citizens" was formally introduced into political
and legal usage by the 1954 Constitution of the PRC, nowhere in
the constitution is it so defined as to make a clear distinction between
"citizens," "people," and "nationals." Judging from the various provisions of the Constitution, it appears that "citizens" is a synonym
61. This is based on interviews with overseas Chinese businessmen.
62. Originally, the "people" was defined to mean members of the four social classes:
the worker, the peasant, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie.
See Mao Tse-tung, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, SELE_-ED WoRKs 1480.
Since then, the method of class differentiation has undergone certain changes, with
the result that the composition of these classes has also changed. The above is a
generalization of the entire concept.
63. 1 FLHP 17 arts. 4 & 5.
64. The CommoN PnorRAm, art. 8 (1949).
65. For a discussion of the distinction between "people" and "nationals," see Phou
En-lai, Report on the Process of Drafting the Comnwn Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, in CruNG-HTA JEN-imN KuNC-Ho-xoo K'Ax-xuo

WEr-nsmN (Documents on the Inauguration of the People's Republic of China)
256-57 (1949). Earlier, in his 1940 essay "On New Democracy," Mao Tse-tung said:
"The word 'nationals' may be used; but nationals do not include counterrevolutionaries
and Chinese traitors." SELECTmE WoRcs 669. This view, which seemed to identify
"nationals" with "people," is obviously superseded by Chou En-lai's report quoted
above.
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of "nationals," with a meaning somewhat broader than the latter's.
That is to say, all Chinese living within the boundaries of the PRC
are its citizens, but the power of the state belongs to the "people,"
not to the citizenry as a whole. Also, the state has the right to
punish "all traitors and counterrevolutionaries" and to deprive "feudal
landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists" of their political rights; other66
wise, all citizens are equal before the law.
As reflected in the PRC's treaty practice, this domestic class differentiation of the population has obvious significance. In the
seventeen political treaties of "friendship and non-aggression" with
six socialist states and ten Afro-Asian countries, the term "people"
is used consistently as identical with the contracting states,67 except
for the treaties with Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia, where the
large Chinese population has long been a serious problem for the
local governments. 68 To avoid further complication of the problem,
the parties refrained from using any of these terms. 69
In trade treaties and agreements, the PRC took a flexible approach.
The three terms mentioned above are alternatively used in a number
of individual documents, depending on the nature of the provisions
and the relations of the parties involved. For example, the Trade
Agreement with India, October 14, 1954, states that "the existing
friendship of the Governments and peoples" of the two contracting
states is related to the purpose of the agreement.70 On the other
hand, the Agreement with India on Trade and Intercourse Between
Tibet Region of China and India, April 29, 1954, provides detailed
rules for the nationals of the contracting parties to enter, travel, and
carry on trade in the designated areas of either party. 71 Then, in the
66. TnE PRC CONST. arts. 2, 19, 85-103 (1954).

67. With the USSR, Feb. 14, 1950, in 1 TYC 1; the Democratic Republic of
Germany, Dec. 25, 1955, in 4 TYC 7; the Republic of Czechoslovakia, March 27, 1957,
in 6 TYC 40; Yemen, January 12, 1958, in 7 TYC 3; the People's Republic of

Hungary, May 6, 1959, in 8 TYC 1; Nepal, April 28, 1960, in 10 TYC 13; the People's
Republic of Mongolia, May 31, 1960, in 9 TYC 37; Afghanistan, August 26, 1960, in
9 TYC 12; Guinea, Sept. 13, 1960, in 10 TYC 1; the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, July 11, 1961, in 10 TYC 25; Ghana, August 18, 1961, in 10 TYC 17; Yemen
(replacing the Treaty of January 12, 1958), June 9, 1964, in 13 TYC 5; Congo (Brazza-

ville), October 2, 1964, in 13 TYC 27; Mali, Nov. 3, 1964, in 13 TYC 381.
68. With Burma, January 28, 1960, in 9 TYC 44 (1960); Cambodia, Dec. 19, 1960,
in 9 TYC 25; Indonesia, April 1, 1961, in 10 TYC 7.

69. As further evidence of this, the treaty with Indonesia concerning the problem of
dual nationality refers to the Chinese residents in that country either as "persons having

nationality of the People's Republic of China" or simply as "Chinese persons (chungkuo-jen)." In 8 TYC 12, 14 (1959).
70. 3 TYC 28 (1954) (emphasis added).
71. In 3 TYC 1, 3 (1954) (emphasis added); see Exchange of Notes with India,
April 29, 1954, in 3 TYC 4-7. Similar provisions can be found in the Agreement with

Nepal on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and Nepal, Sept. 20,
1956, in 5 TYC 4.
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Exchange of Notes with Nepal, August 14, 1962, concerning the choice
of nationality and other problems, the term "citizens" replaced "nationals."7 2 Whether the Indian and Nepalese governments were aware
of the political and legal connotations of those terms is unknown.
Aside from this, the PRC and contracting parties have employed a
neutral term in their agreements, namely, "natural and juristic
persons." A standard clause is found in the 1958 Treaty of Trade
and Navigation with the USSR, article 14:
Juristic and natural persons of either Contracting Party shall in all respects
enjoy in the territory of the other Party treatment no less favorable than
73
that accorded to juristic and natural persons of any third State.

Precisely which category of the Chinese belong to "natural persons"
is not specified. Other formal treaties of trade and navigation followed
suit in this regard,7 4 except the Treaty with the Democratic Republic
of Germany, January 18, 1960, in which treatment of natural persons
of either contracting state is not even mentioned. 5 However, viewed
from the context of the PRC's foreign trade practice, the omission
of natural persons from treaty status is really not surprising. Of the
seven treaties cited above, six were concluded with socialist states
whose policy is to do business on a governmental basis. The mostfavored-nation treatment accorded to natural persons in five of these
treaties is at best ceremonial, because in each case, the right of
individuals to engage in private business is virtually nil. Thus, in
all trade agreements with non-socialist countries, except Yemen and
some of the PRC's neighboring states (for example, India and Nepal)
where frontier trade is involved, the parties simply ignored any
establishment provisions concerning the rights of natural and juristic
persons. Instead, they introduced in some instances a formula conforming to each other's foreign trade systems. Article one of the
Trade Agreement with Finland, June 5, 1953, states:
72. In 11 TYC 15 (1962).
73. In 7 TYC 42, 46 (1958).
74. With Albania, art. 14, Feb. 2, 1961, in 10 TYC 290, 294; the People's Republic
of Mongolia, art. 12, April 26, 1961, in 10 TYC 361, 364; the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, art. 13, Nov. 5, 1962, in 11 TYG 92, 96; the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam, art. 13, Dec. 5, 1962, in 11 TYC 100, 104. The Treaty with Yemen,
January 12, 1958, art. 7, provides: "Natural and juristic persons of either Contracting
Party shall strictly observe in the territory of the other Party the existing local laws
and regulations, respect [local] religions, custom, and habits, and shall not interfere
with the internal affairs of the country in which they reside." 7 TYC 28, 29.
75. Article 14 of the Treaty provides: "Unless otherwise provided for in other
agreements, juristic persons of either Contracting Party shall in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty enjoy in the territory of the other Party the same rights and
favors accorded to juristic persons of any third State." 9 TYC 134, 138 (1960).
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• ..The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China
shall designate its state enterprise corporations to supply the natural or
juristic persons appointed by the Government of the Republic of Finland
with goods listed in Schedule A of this Agreement; the natural or juristic

persons designated by the Government of the Republic of Finland shall
supply the state enterprise corporations appointed by the Government of

the People's Republic of China with goods listed in Schedule B of this
Agreement ....76

Another example is the Agreement for the Exchange of Goods
and Payments with Afghanistan, July 28, 1957, article four providing:
The exchange of commodities between the two States shall be conducted
on the basis of the contracts made between the individual organizations,
corporations, and traders formally authorized by the Government of the

for this purpose, and the Chinese import and export
Kingdom of Afghanistan
77
corporations.

Unlike the nationality of vessels, which in the PRC's practice is
generally determined on the basis of "the papers carried by the
vessel and issued by the competent authorities in accordance with
the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party under whose flag
the vessel is sailing,"78 the above agreements made no mention of
the method by which the nationality of a corporation of either contracting party may be determined. Nor did they specify the status
and rights of those natural and juristic persons involved. However, in
light of those provisions, it is quite clear that on the Chinese side there
is only one kind of corporation-the state corporations of the PRC;
on the Finnish and Afghan side, the individuals and corporations are
all appointed by their governments and act in their capacity as government agents. In other instances where such provisions were not
introduced or were found inadequate to regulate the trade relations
of the parties, they agreed to establish "trade missions or delegations
(shang-wu-tai-piao-chu)."
B. Trade Missions
The idea of establishing trade missions abroad (torgpredstov) as
official representatives of the state originates from Soviet Russia.
76. 2 TYC 35 (1953).

77. 6 TYC 139, 140 (1957). For other similar examples, see Trade Agreement with
the Republic of Tunis, art. 4, Sept. 25, 1958, in 7 TYC 96, 97; Trade and Payments

Agreement with the Republic of Ghana, art. 5, August 18, 1961, in 10 TYC 252, 253;
Trade and Payments Agreement with Congo (Brazzaville),

July 23, 1964, art. 1, in

13 TYC 281.
78. The Treaty of Trade and Navigation with the USSR, April 23, 1958, art. 10, in
7 TYC 45. Similar provisions can be found in other treaties of the same nature with
the PRC.
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Before 1933, their status was defined in a number of international
conventions which the Soviet regime entered into with other countries. 79 On September 13, 1933, a statute was promulgated authorizing
the trade missions to exercise abroad "the rights of the Union of the
Soviet Socialist Republics pertaining to the monopoly of foreign trade
enjoyed by the Union."8 0 As distinguished from corporate bodies,
these trade missions are not legal entities, rather, they are part of
the corresponding diplomatic missions of the Soviet Union abroad
and enjoy the latter's privileges. In addition to their various functions relating to the operation and regulation of Soviet foreign trade,
they are authorized to conclude in the name of the Soviet state all
ldnds of contracts and legal transactions, and the Treasury of the
Soviet state is liable for obligations incurred by the trade missions. 81
Although the PRC has not promulgated such a law, it persistently
follows this Soviet principle with some variations. In about a dozen
agreements, where a clause for the exchange of trade missions was
included, Japan appeared to be the first country in which the PRC
expressed this trade mission interest. From 1952 to 1958, Japan
entered into four "non-governmental" or "semi-governmental" trade
agreements with the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade (CCPIT).sz A memorandum attached to the second agreement,
October 29, 1953, stated: "The Contracting Parties agreed to exchange
trade missions; Japan will establish her permanent trade mission in
China when China's permanent trade mission has been established in
Japan." 83 Following this, the third agreement, May 4, 1955, article
10, specified the locations of the trade missions and provided these
missions and their members with "diplomatic treatment and rights."8
The agreement did not say how such treatment and rights could be
granted in the absence of diplomatic relations between the two
countries and a direct and open commitment by their governments,
It merely added: "The Contracting Parties agreed to work for the
realization [of this provision] as early as possible.", Perhaps the
Japanese felt that such a provision was nothing more than a promise
on paper. From Peking's point of view, it was not entirely so; the
79. Protocol on the Legal Status of the Trade Representation of the USSR in
Lithuania, August 29, 1931, in TARAcouzio, THE SovIEr UNION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw 431 (1935).
80. Statute Concerning Trade Missions and Trade Agencies of the USSR Abroad,
Sept. 13, 1933, § 1, 2 Gsovsnr, SovI-r Civi LAw 347 (1949).
81. Id. at 348-52.
82. For a discussion of the organization of the CCPIT, see Hsiao, supra note 2,
at 313-18.
83. 2 TYC 372 (1953).
84. 4 TYC 258, 260 (1955).
85. Id.
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agreement was viewed as a steppingstone toward full diplomatic
recognition by Japan.
Finally, in contrast to the previous agreements where the status
of the trade missions was dealt with only in generalities, the fourth
agreement, March 5, 1958, contained details. Defining the trade
missions as "private" delegations representing the signatories of the
agreement onlyO-instead of being agents of their governments as
implied on the two previous occasions-the agreement accorded the
trade missions the following reciprocal treatment: (1) security
protection of the trade missions and their members; (2) choice of
methods to settle legal disputes after agreement between the contracting parties; (3) facilitation of the procedures for the entry and
exit of trade mission members and favorable treatment of these
members by the customs; (4) the freedom of travel for the purpose
of carrying out trade activities; (5) the right to use ciphers for the
conduct of business; (6) the right to fly national flags on the buildings
of the trade missions; and (7) exemption from fingerprinting of trade
mission members and their dependents.8 7
Shortly after the conclusion of the agreement, difficulties arose
in fulfillment of those provisions by the Japanese. While recognizing
the "necessity" of expanding trade with the PRC, the Kishi government would support the agreement only on three conditions: the
PRC must respect the domestic law of Japan, accept the fact of
non-recognition between the two governments, and take into account
the present international relations (presumably Japan's relations with
the Republic of China and the United States).8 In reply, the Chinese
contended that the Japanese government's refusal to recognize the
PRC was an act of "hostility towards the 600 million Chinese people"
and that the PRC would respect the domestic law of Japan, provided
that this law was applied indiscriminately. As to the present international relations, the PRC contended that the Japanese government
should first of all assure the successful implementation of the agreement "in order to pave the way for the restoration of Sino-Japanese
diplomatic relations"; otherwise, the Chinese could not execute the
86. On the Chinese side, the two top signatories were Nan Han-ch'en, Chairman of
the CCPIT and Director-General of the Chinese People's Bank under the State Council, and Lei Jen-min, First Vice-Chairman of the CCPIT and First Vice-Minister of
Foreign Trade. On the Japanese side, the top signatory was Masanosuke Ikeda, Chairman of the League of Japanese Diet Members for the Promotion of Japanese-Chinese
Trade. 7 TYC 200 (1958).
87. Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement, March 5, 1958, art. 11, in 7 TYC 197, 199;
Memorandum, March 5, 1958, in 7 TYC 201-02.
88. Three Japanese Organizations' Telegram to Nan Han-ch'en, April 9, 1958, in
5 TWKH 271 (1958).
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agreement. 89 Then on May 2, 1958, some Japanese demonstrators
insulted a PRC national flag on display at a fair in Nagasaki, and the
Sino-Japanese trade broke off for several years. 90
On August 7, 1960, when Japanese businessman Gazuo Suzuki
called on Premier Chou En-lai in an effort to resume trade with the
PRC, Chou made it clear that trade was inseparable from politics.
Accordingly, he laid down "three trading principles" and "three
political principles" as the basis of future Sino-Japanese trade. The
former called for conclusion of governmental agreements, private
contracts, and individual transactions; the latter required Japan not
to adopt any hostile attitude towards the PRC, not to follow the
United States in the "conspiracy of creating two Chinas," and not
to obstruct the development of normalization of relations between
the PRC and Japan. 91 Finally, after a year-long negotiation, Japanese
traders, with their government's understanding, accepted these conditions and incorporated them into the Liao Ch'eng-chih and Takasaki
Memorandum (better known as "L-T Agreement"), November 9,
1962, which was to last five years.92 The agreement does not contain
any establishment provisions. Subsequently, however, the two parties
exchanged trade representatives and news correspondents. According
to this arrangement, either party was to obtain entry permits for
the representatives of the other party and to guarantee their safety;
news correspondents were entitled to enjoy treatment equal to that
accorded to any other foreign correspondents by the receiving state.93
Although the Japan case is unique in some respects, mainly due
to Japan's traditional ties with the mainland of China,4 it is by no
means an isolated phenomenon. Egypt exchanged government trade
missions with the PRC while maintaining diplomatic relations with
89. Nan Han-ch'en's Reply to Three Japanese Organizations, April 13, 1958, in 5
TWKH at 267-71.
90. Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi's Interview with Correspondents of the Hsin Hua
News Agency, May 9, 1958, in 5 TWKH at 104-06.

91. Chou En-lai, On the Three Principles of Sino-Japanese Trade, 1961 JMST
167-68.
92. 11 TYC 157-58 (1962); see Premier Chou En-lai's Address to Japanese Liberal
Democrat Kenzo Muramatsu on the Principles of Sino-Japanese Relations, Sept. 19,
1962, in 9 TWKH 357-58. Liao Ch'eng-chih was Chairman of the Commission on
Overseas Chinese Affairs and concurrently a member of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party; Tazunosuke Takasaki was ex-Minister of Trade and Commerce. Thus, the agreement assumes a semi-governmental character.
93. Summary of the Meeting Minutes Between the Liao Ch'eng-chih Office and the
Takasaki Office for Exchange of Representatives and Liaison Offices, April 19, 1964, in
1964 JMST 454; Summary of the Meeting Minutes Between the Liao Ch'-eng-chih
Office and the Takasaki Office for Exchange of News Correspondents, April 19, 1964, id,
No
94. For reference, see JAPAN Ex:TERuAL TRADE ORGANIZATiON, Nicnu Bomi
TEBna (Introduction to Japanese-Chinese Trade) (1966).
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Taipei. 95 Nine months later on May 16, 1956, when Egypt finally
severed her relations with Taipei and recognized the PRC, 96 Minister
Yeh Chi-chuang bailed it as a success of the regime's foreign trade
97
policy.
Countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Peking and having
agreements for the exchange of trade missions include India and
the Soviet Union. 8 According to the Agreement with India on Trade
and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India, April 29,
1954, the two parties agreed to exchange "trade agencies (shang-wutai-li-ch'u)."99 The Soviet statute of September 13, 1933, section 12,
stipulates that the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade may
establish independent trade agencies for the countries in which there
are no trade missions of the USSR or for individual districts within
the countries in which trade missions are located. 100 The PRC has
offered no statutory explanation as to the distinction between these
two types of trade delegations. In practice, the said agreement provides the trade agents of both parties with freedom from arrest while
exercising their functions and with the right to enjoy freedom from
search in respect to themselves, their wives, and dependent children.
It also provides the trade agencies of both parties with privileges and
immunities for couriers, mail-bags, and communications in code. In
addition, the trade agents of both parties may, in accordance with
the laws and regulations of the local governments, have access to
their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases. 10 1 However, the
agreement did not mention the commercial functions of the agencies,
95. Trade Agreement with Egypt, August 22, 1955, art. 6, provides for the exchange
of government trade missions with "due respect" for their status and security protection.
4 TYC 123, 124.
96. 1957 JMST 362.
97. See Editorial of Ta-kung Pao, Peking, August 11, 1955, 2 EssAYs 96-98; Yeh
Chi-chuang, A New Stage in the Development of Economic Relations Between China
and Egypt, 2 EssAYs at 99-101; Celebrating the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
Between China and Egypt, 2 EssAYs at 102-05.
98. For reference to other countries, see Trade Agreement with Syria, Nov. 30,
1955, in 4 TYC 118; Protocol Modifying the Trade and Payments Agreements with
Syria, July 3, 1957, in 6 TYC 161; Trade Agreement with Lebanon, Dec. 31, 1955,
in 4 TYC 159; Agreement with Nepal on Trade and Intercourse, Sept. 20, 1956, in
5 TYC 4. In the Exchange of Notes with Government of Sudan Concerning the
Trade Problems of the Two Countries, April 12, 1956, it was provided that the contracting states agreed in principle "to encourage the exchange of trade delegates in
order to develop the economic and trade relations between the two States." 5 TYC 59.
99. 3 TYC 1.
100. 2 GsovsKr, supra note 80, at 352.
101. Exchange of Notes with India, April 29, 1954, in 3 TYC 4, 5. Similar provisions are to be found in the Agreement with Nepal on Trade and Intercourse, Sept.
20, 1956, and the Exchange of Notes with Nepal on the same date. 5 TYC 4-10.
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such as their capacity to conclude transactions; 10 2 in fact, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Peking formally classified the agreement as a
political treaty. 1' 3 Furthermore, the Chinese trade agencies were
established in New Delhi, Calcutta, and Kalimpong, whereas the
1°4
Indian representation was confined to Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok,
thus reducing the Indian agencies to a local status.
In contrast to the agreements with Japan and India, Peking's arrangement with Moscow for exchange of trade missions is consistent
with the 1933 Soviet statute. The Annex of the Treaty of Trade and
Navigation with the Soviet Union, article 1, stipulates the functions
of the trade missions as follows: (1) promoting the development of
trade and economic relations between the two states; (2) representing
the interests of its own state in the other state in all matters relating
to foreign trade; (3) regulating trading transactions with the other
state on behalf of its own state; and (4) carrying on trade between
the two states.0 5 As regards the status of the trade mission, it forms
an integral part of the embassy of its own state and thus enjoys
certain rights and privileges accorded to a diplomatic mission, including: diplomatic immunity for the trade mission chief and his deputies,
extraterritoriality for the premises occupied by the trade mission and
its branches, the right to use ciphers, waiver of commercial registration by the trade mission and its branches, and exemption from
taxation of its employees who are citizens of the state to which
the mission belongs (article 2). Acting in the name of its own
government, the trade mission is responsible for foreign commercial
contracts concluded or guaranteed on behalf of the trade mission in
the receiving state and signed by authorized persons. The names
of the persons authorized to take legal action on behalf of the trade
mission and information concerning the extent to which each such
person is empowered to sign commercial contracts on its behalf are
to be published in the government publication of the receiving state
(article 3). Finally, the trade mission enjoys all the immunities to
which a sovereign state is entitled and which relate also to foreign
trade, with the following exceptions:
(1) Disputes regarding foreign commercial contracts concluded or guaranteed under article 3 by the trade mission in the territory of the receiving
102. The Soviet statute of Sept. 13, 1933, § 14, provides: "The purpose of trade
agencies shall consist in performing individual tasks assigned by the present statute
to the trade missions. The functions, territorial confines, and method of procedure of
trade agencies, shall be determined in each by the People's Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs." 2 GsovsEi supra note 80, at 352.
103. 3 TYC 1 (1954).
104. Agreement with India, April 29, 1954, art. 1, in 3 TYC 1.
105. 7 TYC 47 (1958).
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state shall, in the absence of a reservation regarding arbitration or any
other jurisdiction, be subject to the competence of the courts of the
said state. No interim court orders for the provision of security may be
made; (2) Final judicial decisions against the trade mission in the aforementioned disputes which have become legally valid may be enforced by

execution, but such execution may be levied only on the goods and claims
outstanding to the credit of the trade mission [article 4].

If the PRC were to continue to follow Soviet legal patterns, the

foregoing provisions may eventually become the pattern of its future
legislation concerning the functions and status of trade missions. As
of 1964, however, the PRC showed little interest in this "legalistic"
approach of the Soviet Union; as evidence of this attitude, the
PRC's agreement with Nepal for exchange of trade agencies, like
that with India, is officially classified as being political rather than
commercial. 1 6 Likewise, the arrangements with Lebanon and Syria
accorded the trade missions diplomatic status without specifying their
trading functions and legal capacities.3° More noteworthy is the fact
that, aside from the Soviet Union, the PRC made no treaty arrangements with any other socialist state for the exchange of trade missions
or agencies. Since the establishment of trade missions is a Soviet
invention, related to the state monopoly of foreign trade, one wonders
why the PRC's application of this socialist principle is largely limited
to Afro-Asian nations, particularly those having no diplomatic relations
with Peking and those controversial neighboring countries like India
and Nepal. Surmising from the official treaties under review, it seems
reasonably clear that Peking's strategy was to make use of the
trade missions as originally designed by the Soviet Union, but to
expand their political role whenever possible and desirable.
IV. NATIONAL AND MOsT-FAvORED-NATIoN TREATMENT
Although national and most-favored-nation treatment are two different commitments in modern commercial treaties, the distinction is
sometimes blurred. For instance, an authoritative British publication
suggests that the aim of the most-favored-nation clause:
[H]as been to secure three objects---'national' treatment of British subjects
in foreign countries, that is to say, treatment on the same basis as the
nationals of the country concerned; similar 'national' treatment of British
106. Agreement with Nepal on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of
China and Nepal, Sept. 20, 1956, in 5 TYC 4.
107. Trade Agreement with Lebanon, Dec. 31, 1955, art. 8, in 4 TYC 159, 160;
Trade Agreement with Syria, Nov. 30, 1955, art. 8, in 4 TYC 118, 119; Protocol Modifying Trade and Payments Agreements with Syria, July 3, 1957, art. 1, in 6 TYC 161,
162. It should be noted that Lebanon has not diplomatically recognized the Peking
regime.
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ships in the question of navigation; and most-favored-nation treatment for

British goods in all matters of customs, that is to say, treatment on108the
same basis as that accorded to the goods of any other foreign power.

To be sure, the principles of national and most-favored-nations treatment are sometimes provided side by side in the same treaty, 0 9 but
there is a difference in the choice of the base upon which equality is
measured. In the PRC's trade treaty practice, this difference becomes
even more conspicuous because of the PRC's political and economic
system.
A. National Treatment
Theoretically, the Peking Foreign Trade Institute defines the
national-treatment principle as follows:
According to this principle, either contracting state guarantees to the

nationals, enterprises, or vessels of the other contracting state in its territory
treatment as it is accorded to its own nationals, enterprises, and
the same
110
vessels.

It is also recognized that this principle generally applies to the
economic rights of foreign citizens and enterprises, internal taxation,
the treatment of vessels, railway transport and transit, and civil
suits."' In practice, the PRC has followed the Soviet Union in
asserting that extensive application of the national-treatment principle by "powerful imperialist states" in their trade treaties and
agreements with small and weak nations constitutes a legal basis for
the former to encroach upon the latter's economy." 2 Accordingly,
the PRC has limited its application to circumstances involving the
question of "humanitarianism" only. A standard clause denoting this
version of the national-treatment principle is found in the 1958 Treaty
of Trade and Navigation with the USSR, article 9:
108. THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ME_
MOsT-FAvoRED-NATION

CLAUSE

AS

AN

INSTRUMENT

OF

OANDUM ON TrE

INTERNATIONAL

POLICY

1

(1933).
109. E.g., the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United

States of America and Japan, April 2, 1953, art. 4, para. 1, provides: "Nationals and
companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment with respect to access to the courts of justice and to administrative tribunals
and agencies within the territories of the other Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction,
both in pursuit and in defense of their rights." 1 MErzGER, LAw OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 1, 3 (1966).
110. WANG YAO-T'IFN 23.

111. Id.
112. Id.;

347.

cf.

Tmsi,. & SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF SovsmT TnEATIES
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If a vessel of one Contracting Party is in distress or is wrecked on the
coast of the other Contracting Party, such vessel and its cargo shall enjoy

the same advantages and immunities as are granted under the laws of
the latter State to its own vessels in similar circumstances. The necessary

aid and assistance shall be afforded at all times, and in the same measure
as in the case of national vessels in the same situation, to the master, crew
and passengers, and to the vessel and its cargo. Where there are special
agreements on such matters, aid shall likewise be afforded in accordance
with such agreements.1 13

The above "humanitarian" treatment is, however, limited to socialist
countries which have such agreements with the PRC.1 4 In agreements
with non-socialist countries, it has been provided that a vessel of either
contracting party in distress or otherwise endangered in the territorial
waters of the other party is only to receive "all possible aid and
assistance" within the limits of the latter's law." 5
Peking's denial of national treatment to foreign citizens in matters
concerning trade other than shipwreck does not appear to be so much
an expression of nationalistic ideology, as the official Chinese literature
tends to suggest, but rather is determined by the very nature of the
state and its economy. First of all, under the system of state monopoly of foreign trade, the citizens of the PRC are themselves denied
the right to do private business with foreign countries. It is true
that in Hong Kong and other neighboring areas there are "private"
Chinese corporations importing and exporting goods for the mainland
of China. But these so-called private corporations are, in Peking's
view, agencies of the state and thus part of the state trading system.
Moreover, these corporations are technically under foreign jurisdictions and, therefore, cannot be related to the present discussion.
Secondly, as sole owner of all business corporations and productive
property, the state simply cannot treat foreign nationals on an equal
footing and thereby allow them to share its sovereign rights and
privileges. Additionally, as discussed above, the individuals of the
PRC are given three different titles: "people," "nationals," and
"citizens," and each category is entitled to certain economic and
legal rights under the 1949 and 1954 constitutions. Thus, if a foreign
treaty partner seeks to secure national treatment from the PRC, the
113. 7 TYC 42, 45 (1958).
114. The Democratic Republic of Germany, January 18, 1960, in 9 TYC 134, 137;
Albania, Feb. 2, 1961, in 10 TYC 290, 293; the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
Dec. 5, 1962, in 11 TYC 100, 103; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Nov. 5, 1962, in 11 TYC 92, 95.
115. Sea Transport Agreements: with Ceylon, July 25, 1963, art. 5, in 12 TYC 25152; Ghana, March 26, 1963, art. 5, in 12 TYC 234-35; Congo (Brazzaville), October
2, 1964, art. 5, in 13 TYC 366-67.
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question arises as to which category's treatment the foreigners would
receive.
As a secondary reference, however, it is interesting to note that
Peking has invented a sort of unilateral national treatment for its own
citizens overseas. In its aid programs to Afro-Asian countries, the
PRC adopted "eight principles," one of which provides:
The experts dispatched by the Chinese Government to help in construction
in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the
allowed to
experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not
11 6
make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.

While in reality the principle was enunciated to coordinate with the
PRO's diplomatic offensive in Africa, it also appeared in a number
of aid agreements and was thus endowed with a legal character comparable to national treatment.117 The difference between this type of
national treatment and the normal type is that the former is a selfimposing and unilateral act on the part of the PRC, and its scope of
application is basically confined to the question of "living standard"
and unspecified "amenities,"11 8 whereas the latter is primarily concerned with the legal status of the nationals involved in trade and
other activities provided for in the treaty.
B. Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
In contrast to its attitude toward national treatment, the PRC
employed the most-favored-nation clause as a fundamental principle
of its trade treaties and agreements. Imitating a classical analysis of
the clause presented by Richard Carlton Snyder in his 1948 monograph," 9 the Peking Foreign Trade Institute described its basic forms
116. These eight principles originated from Premier Chou En-ai's reply to the
Ghana News Agency's questions on January 15, 1964, in 1964 JMST 392-93 (English
translation in Joint Communiqu6 of China and Tanganyika-Zanzibar, June 19, 1964,
Peking Review, No. 26, June 26, 1964, pp. 12-13).
117. Agreement with Guinea on Economic and Technical Cooperation, Sept. 13,
1960, in 9 TYC 80; Agreement with Nepal on Economic Aid, March 21, 1960, in 9
TYC 84; Agreement with Indonesia on Economic and Technical Cooperation, October
11, 1961, in 10 TYC 245; Agreement with Ghana on Economic and Technical Cooperation, August 18, 1961, in 10 TYC 250; Agreement with Mali on Economic and
Technical Cooperation, Sept. 22, 1961, in 10 TYC 333; Agreement with Burma on
Economic and Technical Cooperation, October 1, 1961, in 10 TYC 369; Joint Communiqu6 of China and Mali, January 21, 1964, in 13 TYC 15.
118. For example, in the agreement with Ghana cited in note 117, it is provided that
the Chinese specialists and technicians working in Ghana shall receive their living
expenses from the Ghana government; however, their living standard shall not exceed
the living standard of their local counterparts. The same agreement did not impose
such restrictions on the Ghana personnel studying skills in China.
119. R. C. SNYDER, THE MOsT-FAvoRED-NATiON

CrAusE (1948).
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in five categories: (1) Conditional or unconditional; the conditional
form implies that concessions shall be generalized only upon the
reciprocal payment of equivalent compensation, whereas the unconditional form lays down no conditions under which concessions
granted by contracting states should be generalized. (2) Unilateral
or mutual; the mutual form consists of the reciprocal grant of mostfavored-nation treatment, whereas the unilateral form provides one
contracting state with most-favored-nation treatment while denying
the other the right to enjoy the same. (3) Limited or unlimited; the
limited form confines the application of the clause to certain specified
objects or territories, whereas the unlimited form imposes no restrictions on the scope of application. (4) Positive or negative; the
positive form requires that either contracting state undertakes to grant
the other all privileges, favors, and immunities it has granted or may
hereafter grant to any other third states, while the negative form
stipulates that neither contracting state shall treat the other less
favorably than it does any other third states. (5) Simple and complex;
the simple form is one which contains a general statement providing
most-favored-nation treatment, whereas the complex form defines the
clause in greater detail and usually consists of four parts concerning
its general purpose, interpretation, limitations, and exceptions.120 In
practice, the PRC favored the unconditional, mutual, and limited
forms and rejected the conditional form as being "out-of-fashion" and
the unilateral and unlimited forms as being "unequal."' 21 With respect
to the forms in the fourth and fifth categories, they are considered a
matter of technicality, rather than principle.
Since individuals play an insignificant role in Peking's foreign trade,
the scope of application of the clause is basically confined to navigation and commerce proper. It first appeared in the Trade Agreement
with Egypt, August 22, 1955, in which both parties agreed to grant
most-favored-nation treatment in matters concerning the issuance of
import and export licenses and customs duties.'22 After the agreement
with Egypt, the PRC reached similar agreements with no less than
ten countries; the scope of application was widened so as to include
taxes and other charges imposed on goods, the warehousing of goods,
customs regulations and procedures, and navigation.' But the most
120. WA c YAo-T'mN 28-33; SNYimi, supra note 119, at 20-21, 52, 58. Aside from

Snyder's work, Wang Yao-t'ien also used as one of his major references, Hornbeck,
The Most-Favored-Nation Clause (pts. 1 & 2), 3 Am. J. INT. L. 395, 619 (1909).
121. In this connection, Peking exploited .China's past to justify its viewpoints.
For reference to the role of mbst-favored-nation 'triatment in China's past treaties,
see SzE, CmHNA AND THE MOST-FAvoREi-NAnON CLAuS. (1925).
Egyptian government
122. 4 TYC 123 '(1955). It is to be remembered that the
the Peking regime.
made this commitment before its recognition of
123. Syria, Nov. 30, 1955, in 4 TYC 118; Leban6n, Dec.,81, 1955, ir 4 TYC 159;
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sweeping application of the clause remains to be found in the 1958

Treaty of Trade and-Navigation with the USSR. Of the seventeen
articles in the treaty, ten deal with most-favored-nation treatment.
Beginning with a general statement granting the contracting parties

"most-favored-nation treatment in all matters relating to trade, navigation and other economic relations between the two States" (article 2),
the treaty proceeds to specify the objects to which the clause applies.
These include: all customs matters relating to the importation or
exportation of natural and manufactured products of either contracting
party (articles 3 and 4); internal taxation or charges (article 6);
restrictions on importation or exportation for reasons of national

security, public health, etc. (article 7); vessels and their cargoes
(article 8); conveyance of goods, passengers and baggage by internal
railways, roads or waterways (article 11); goods in transit (article 12);

the legal status of natural and juristic persons (article 14); and exceptions of the clause in frontier trade (article 15).124
Subsequent to the conclusion of this treaty, six other socialist countries followed suit, 25 and together with eleven additional non-socialist

countries, 12 the PRC made the most-favored-nation commitment with
twenty-nine countries out of a total of forty-eight governmental and
non-governmental trade treaty partners. The ones with whom the
PRC did not make such a commitment are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,

Hungary, Poland, and Rumania on the socialist side; Afghanistan,
Algeria, Austria, Burma, Cambodia, France, West Germany, India,
Japan, Nepal, Nigeria, Singapore-Malaya, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom on the non-socialist side. The absence of the clause in the
PRC's trade treaty relations with these countries should not be conYugoslavia, Feb. 17, 1956, in 5 TYC 113; Finland, March 31, 1956, in 5 TYC 61
(1956); Indonesia, Nov. 3, 1956, in 5 TYC 56; Ceylon, Sept. 19, 1957, in 6 TYC
203; Sweden, Nov. 8, 1957, in 6 TYC 181; Denmark, Dec. 1, 1957, in 6 TYC 45;
Pakistan, Dec. 24, 1957, in 7 TYC 35; Yemen, January 12, 1958, in 7 TYC 28.
124. 7 TYC 42-46 (1958).
125. The Democratic Republic of Germany, January 18, 1960, in 9 TYC 134; Cuba,
July 23, 1960, in 10 TYC 238; Albania, Feb. 2, 1961, in 10 TYC 290; the People's
Republic of Mongolia, April 26, 1961, in 10 TYC 361; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Nov. 5, 1962, in 11 TYC 92; the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
Dec. 5, 1962, in 11 TYC 100. It should be noted that the agreement with Cuba is
rather general, mostly concerned with customs matters and taxation.
126. Norway, June 4, 1958, in 7 TYC 94; Tunis, Sept. 25, 1958, in 7 TYC 96; the
United Arab Republic, Dec. 15, 1958, in 7 TYC 57 (this is an enlargement of the
earlier agreement, supra note 122, at 78); Iraq, January 3, 1959, in 8 TYC 53, Sept.
23, 1964, in 13 TYC 277; Guinea, Sept., 13, 1960, in 9 TYC 82; Mali, Feb. 28, 1961,
in 10 TYC 327; Ghana, August 18, 1961, in 10 TYC 2,52; March 26, 1963, in 12 TYC
234; Sudan, May 23, 1962, in 11 TYC 56; Somali, May 15, 1963, in 12 TYC 178;
Congo (Brazzaville), July 23, 1964, in 13 TYC 281, October 2, 1964, in 13 TYC
366; Central Africa, Sept. 29, 1964, in 13 TYC 262; Burundi, October 22, 1964, in
13 TYC 269. The arrangement of the most-favored-nation clause in these agreements
varies, but they all deal with navigation and commerce.
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strued as a phenomenon of restraint of trade; 2 7 rather, it is a question
of their individual relations. Since analysis of these relations is beyond the scope of the present discussion, a further inquiry into Peking's general view of the most-favored-nation clause and its real
value in trade practice may help to clarify certain points.
Like the socialist theory of law in general, Peking makes a distinction between the "capitalist" and the socialist principles of most-

favored-nation treatment. Initially a progressive institution designed
to increase free trade, the capitalist principle has now become a tool

of monopolistic capital, and of "imperialism" designed to realize its
128

economic expansionism and to enslave small and weak nations.
Citing the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between
the Republic of China and the United States, November 4, 1946, as
an example, Peking contended that while Americans were entitled to
enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in China, the "anti-Chinese" immigration law of the United States remained applicable to Chinese
persons.'2 9 As further evidence, the provisions of article 21 of the
Treaty were construed as an obligation of the Republic of China to

whereas
open all coastal ports and inland waters to the United States,
30
article 27 makes the Panama Canal Zone an exception.

127. West Germany and Japan, for example, have been among the PRC's largest
trading partners for years. The five socialist states maintained normal trade relations
with the PRC, at least before the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet split. For reference to
the PRC's foreign trade figures, see ECKSTEIN, CoMMUNIsT CHINAS ECONOMIC Gnowni
AND FOREIGN TRADE (1966).
128. WANG YAo-TImN 27-28;

cf. TmSKA & SLussER, supra note 24, at 334.
129. WANG YAo-TmN 50. The Treaty, art. 2, provides most-favored-nation treatment for nationals of either contracting party with respect to their rights to reside,
travel, and carry on trade in the territories of the other contracting party. Article 2,
para. 4, specifies: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to affect existing statutes
of either High Contracting Party in relation to immigration or the right of either
High Contracting Party to enact statutes relating to immigration; provided, however,
that nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the nationals of either High Contracting
Party from entering, traveling, and residing in the territories of the other High Contracting Party in order to carry on trade between the Republic of China and the
United States of America, or to engage in any commercial activity related thereto or
connected therewith, upon terms as favorable as are or may hereafter be accorded
to the nationals of any third country . . . ; and provided further that nothing in the
provisions of Section 3 of the Immigration Act of the United States of America dated
February 5, 1917, which delimit certain geographical zones for the purpose of restricting immigration, shall be construed as preventing admission into the United States of
Chinese persons and persons of Chinese descent." 25 U.N.T.S. 90, 92-94. For reference
to "exclusion of Chinese" in American immigration law, see Act of Feb. 14, 1903,
ch. 552, § 7, 32 Stat. 828.
130. WANG YAO-T'IEN 51. The text of art. 21, para. 1, reads as follows: "Between
the territories of the High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and
navigation." Art. 27 provides: "Subject to any limitation or exception provided in this
Treaty or hereafter agreed upon between the Governments of the High Contracting
Parties, the territories of the High Contracting Parties to which the provisions of this
Treaty extend shall be understood to comprise all areas of, land and water under the
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The socialist principle, on the other hand, serves as an instrument
to realize "economic equality, mutual assistance, and friendly cooperation" in relations with socialist states, and as "a powerful weapon"
for the development of normal international commerce and against
discriminatory policies of non-socialist countries.' 3 ' This twofold
nature of the socialist principle is, however, immediately supplemented
by a quotation from Lenin: "The essence of the provisions adopted
by the contracting parties depends upon the real correlation of forces
and the general international situation as of the moment a treaty is
3
Thus, under the above rule of most-favored-nation
concluded."M'
treatment, "reciprocity" is thought of as being only theory, while
"equality of treatment" is considered to be actually determined by
the nature of the contracting states, the correlation of their economic
strength, and the essence of their relations. 133 While the concept is
consistent with Marx's theory of equality-in the socialist stage every
right is equal in its form but unequal in its content,134-and is also
consistent with Lenin's theory of imperialism, it is not a uniquely
Marxist-Leninist interpretation. In his 1954 essay on "The Rule of
Reciprocity," Henry Drummond-Wolff said:
The most-favored-nation principle and the rule of non-discrimination provide equality of opportunity and access to trade and raw materials as a

legal international right but cannot establish equality of treatment by the
actual exchange of trade on equal terms. The material inequality of
nations due to disparity in their human and natural resources and in their
consuming, producing and purchasing power, compels them to discriminate

in order to obtain reciprocity and establish a balance of payments.
Be that as it may, Peking still rejects the concept of "equal opportunity" as "an imperialist design" of the United States, used to exploit
small nations, and insists on the application of the principle of
"equilibrium." According to Minister of Foreign Trade Yeh Chichuang, "[O]nly by balancing the volume of imports and exports, can
the difficulty of payments be avoided." 13 In some instances, Peking
136
has even preferred barter to other forms of trade.
sovereignty or authority of either High Contracting Party, except the Panama Canal
Zone." 25 U.N.T.S. 128, 138.
131. WAxe YAo-T'IEN 28.

132. Id. at 9; Kozhevnikov, supra note 23, at 223; TRiSKA & SLussFn, supra note
24, at 284.
133. WANe YAo-T'im 27, 31.
134. MARX, CnrrIQUE OF THE GoTHA PROGRAMME 9 (1938).

135. Yeh Chi-chuang, Working for the Development of Normal International Trade,
2 EssAYs 7, 10 (1956). See also Lei Jen-min, New China's Trade with Capitalist
Countries, 1 EssAys 63-68 (1955).
136. E.g., Protocol for the Exchange of Chinese Export Commodities with Burmese
Rice, Nov. 3, 1954, in 3 TYC 137.

1968]

COMMUNIST CHINA'S TRADE TREATIES

With respect to the expansion of multilateral trade, which is a major
function of the most-favored-nation clause, the PRC's attitude is not
totally negative. In article six of the Trade Agreement with Indonesia,
November 3, 1956, both parties agreed to "adopt all appropriate
measures" to expand trade on the multilateral basis.137 Later, speaking to the Asian Economic Seminar on June 20, 1964, the PRC's chief
delegate Nan Han-ch'en proposed that most-favored-nation treatment
or preferential tariffs be employed as an instrument "to create conditions for the gradual development of multilateral trade" among
Afro-Asian and Latin American countries. 1 In practice, however, the
PRC had only one triple trade agreement with Finland and the
Soviet Union. 139 All other trade agreements in the period under review were bilateral.
V.

CONCLUSION

Before the rise of the state trading system, forms of agreement and
rules of commitment were evolved on the assumption that trade would
remain in the hands of free-enterprise. However, the introduction of
state monopoly of foreign trade by Soviet Russia in 1918 upset the
old system. 40 As a result, new problems have arisen. Important
among these new problems are: (1) the tendency in the plannedeconomy countries to regard imports as an accretion to national
wealth and prosperity, rather than as a disturbing competitive factor;
(2) the desire of the planners to limit their dependence upon foreign
trade, because of their concern with stability and their fear of market
fluctuations; (3) the difficulty of numerous small traders in free-enterprise countries in competing with the government of the planned
economy; and (4) the possibility of state-trading countries' dumping
their products on the free-enterprise markets and thereby wrecking
prices.' 4 '
Although interested parties have searched for ways and means to
solve these and related problems, so -as-to-harmonize -trade relations
between the two- different- systems, -their efforts- -have been- without
137. 5 TYC 56 (1956).
138. 1964 JMST 491-93. The Seminar was attended by representatives from 34
countries. See also the Pyongyang Declaration of the Asian Economic Seminar, June
23, 1964, Peking Review, No. 27, July 3, 1964, pp. 20-22.
139. 2 TYC 174 (1953).
140. For a discussion of the development of the Soviet system, see Pozdniakov,
The State Monopoly of Foreign Trade in the USSR, trans. from Sovetskoe gosudarstvo
i pravo, No. 10, 1967, in Soviet Law and Government, No. 3, 1967-1968, pp. 33-40;
for a general appraisal of this system see HuszAR, Sovmi-r PoWER AND PoLcIC 335-69
(1955).
141. HAwxNs, Com-MECr
TREATIms AND AcREEMENTs: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
206-08 (1951).
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wholly satisfactory results. In 1958, after attending an international
conference concerning commercial relations between planned and
free economies, Professors John N. Hazard and Martin Domke came
to the following conclusion:
The most-favored-nation clause cannot achieve an increase in trade, as
it was originally intended to do, nor can the alternative of the commercialconsideration clause be more than a pious expression of intention to avoid

discrimination on political grounds. The other alternative of specific commitments to make purchases of an agreed quantity in a given free economy
throws international commercial intercourse back to the stage of bilateralism

and barter from which the free economies have been seeking to escape
through GATT.142

The above observations on the question of East-West trade are
relevant to the case of the PRC. Although not a member of the
Soviet-sponsored Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and in
spite of its growing rift with Moscow since 1956, the PRC has basically followed the Soviet Union in its foreign trade principles and,
therefore, has presented similar problems to free-enterprise countries.
Haunted by the spectre of China's unhappy commercial relations with
foreign powers before 1949, obsessed with the "recurrent crisis" of
the capitalist market as preached by Marx, and resolved to modernize
the nation through rapid industrialization and collectivization, the
PRC has indeed adopted a policy limiting its imports to essentials for
the national economy. 143 Trade treaties and agreements have been
used as instruments for planning stability, and agreements have been
negotiated and formed solely on the state corporational (or associational) and governmental levels, leaving individuals a place only in
minor frontier trade. Furthermore, on occasions, the PRC has sold its
products on the markets of less developed nations at low prices in
order to win their support. 44 Following Soviet practice, the PRC has
also refused to apply the national-treatment principle excerpt in matters concerning shipwreck. At the same time, it has insisted on inserting the most-favored-nation clause in most of its trade treaties and
agreements, while in reality strictly adhering to bilateralism and
barter, thus undermining the original purpose of the clause.
Given these problems as the common features of the state-trading
system, there are other points worth mentioning after reviewing the
142. Hazard and Domke, State Trading and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 52

Am. J. berr. L. 55, 67-68 (1958). "GATT" stands for the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade; its text is reproduced in 1 ME'rzo~m, LAW oF INTERNATIONAL
Tnunx 528 (1966).
143. Yeh Chi-chuang, Address to the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party (1956), 3 EssAYs 5 (1957).
144. Based on my interviews with overseas Chinese businessmen.
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PRC's foreign trade documents. First, the PRC's justification of its
trade agreements with Japan on the basis of Britain's 1921 trade agreement with Soviet Russia is both weak and ironical. Such justification
is weak because the Anglo-Russian agreement was made at the
governmental level, "pending the conclusion of a formal general peace
treaty between the Governments of these countries," and on the premise that neither contracting party was to conduct hostile action or
propaganda against the institutions of the other. 145 In contrast, the

PRC's agreements with Japan are at best "semi-governmental,""governmental" on the Chinese side and "non-governmental" on the
Japanese side-thus lacking the legal force of the Anglo-Russian agreement. Also, while some of the provisions of the Anglo-Russian agreement-such as the exchange of official agents and the grant of diplomatic immunities-were introduced into the Sino-Japanese agreements,
the IRC has never ceased its hostile action and propaganda against
Japan. A provision of the PRC's General Conditions of Delivery with
Finland, June 5, 1953, expressly forbids any vessel either flying American or Japanese flags or sailing with an American or Japanese master,
to carry cargoes to either of the countries under the terms of the
agreement. 46 In February, 1967, while signing in Peking a protocol
for the promotion of Sino-Japanese trade, the Japanese delegation
acknowledged in the agreement that "Mao Tse-tung's thought is the
most powerful ideological weapon to overcome American imperialism
and Soviet revisionism." 147 On the other hand, the Japanese government has continued to recognize the Government of the Republic of
China as sole representative of all China, an extremely hostile action
from Peking's point of view. In the Anglo-Russian case, on May 27,
1927, the British government denounced, with immediate effect, the
agreement of 1921 on the grounds of "Soviet subversive activities in
the United Kingdom." 48 In the Sino-Japanese case, this has not taken
place-except for the temporary effect of the Nagasaki flag incident
mentioned earlier. Needless to say, the extraordinary complication of
trade relations between Peking and Tokyo stems mainly from their
political and economic needs and policies. The lesson that can be derived from this experience is certainly useful to those nations which
desire to trade with the PRC, while withholding their recognition of
the Peking regime. Law can play a positive role only in normal international commercial intercourse, and it is helpless under conditions
145. Trade Agreement Between His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, March 16, 1921, in 4 L.N.T.S.
128 (1921).
146. 2 TYC 372 (1953).
147. Hsin-wan Pao, (The New Evening Post) (Hong Kong), February 28, 1967, p. 2.
148. SLussEa & TnrsxA. A CALENDAR OF Sovm-r TsATms (1917-1957) 20 (1959).
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where politics and economics dominate every vital issue.
The second point deserving our attention is the relationship of
domestic legislation to trade treaties. Peking recognizes that while
a nation's domestic legislation and administrative measures usually
serve as the foundation of negotiation for the conclusion of trade
treaties and agreements, once a treaty or agreement has been reached,
its provisions become binding upon the contracting states. 149 Proceeding from this position, the regime has repeatedly emphasized the
importance of treaty observance, and it has denounced Japan and
some other unnamed capitalist countries for their failure to fulfill
contractual obligations. At the same time, according to a recent study
by Dr. Luke T. Lee, the PRC's compliance with international treaties
has been basically consistent with its commitments. 5° Nevertheless,
when a nation's domestic legislation is unusually inadequate and
clumsy, as in the case of the PRC, then the question is how much
meaning a lawyer can make out of those general treaty provisions
concerning such matters as: the national treatment of vessels, their
masters and crew members, cargoes and passengers; the most-favorednation treatment of natural and juristic persons; the freedom of official
trade representatives to travel; and, as a recent example, the impact
of the chaotic "cultural revolution" on the rights of foreign traders."'
The third point concerns the application of national and mostfavored-nation treatment in the PRC's treaties. As has been indicated
earlier, the PRC's refusal to apply national treatment to foreigners,
other than in matters of shipwreck, is consistent with its own political
and economic system. Since under normal circumstances a nation
cannot be expected to treat foreigners more favorably than it does
its own citizens, except in the case of colonial and semi-colonial trade,
the PRC's practice is also not a violation of the generally accepted
rules of international law. What complicates the situation is the
PRC's insistence upon the insertion of the most-favored-nation clause
into its trade treaties and agreements, especially those with nonsocialist countries. The clause is not only different from national treatment but may conflict with it. A quotation from Snyder may suffice
to explain the relationship between the two clauses:
149. WANG YAo-T'mN 16.
150. Lee, Treaty Relations of the People's Republic of China: A Study of Compl.
ance, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 244 (1967).
151. During the nearly three-year-old cultural revolution, reports on Chinese
Communist Red Guards' assault on foreign embassies, officials, and citizens were
numerous. For example, in June, 1967, when two Soviet trade representatives went
to Shenyang with officials of a Chinese firm, they were reportedly "seriously injured"
by physical violence inflicted upon them by Red Guards. Washington Post, June 23,
1967, at A12. In another instance, three British ship officers had to read "Quotations
from Chairman Mao Tse-tung," walk up and down a wharf in Shanghai for 90 minutes,
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When two states promise each other national treatment and then promise
other states most-favored-nation treatment; in such a case, the latter group
may legitimately claim that they are also entitled to be treated on a 'national basis,' for otherwise they are not being treated as favorably as the
2
most-favored-nation.15

Having said this much about the present and potential problems in

trading with the PRC, a word about its prospect is in order. As a

nation comprising almost 10 million square kilometers in area and at

least 600 million inhabitants with enormous natural resources, the
PRC is undoubtedly one of the largest markets in the world. Under
normal conditions, it could benefit its own population and provide a
dynamic force for the advancement of human well-being through the
effective exchange of technological knowledge, natural and manu-

factured products, and specialized services. Hawkins' observation of

the desire of the planned economies to free themselves from de-

pendence upon foreign trade for the sake of planning stability appears
to have overlooked the fact that no nation can develop a modern

economy without some foreign trade. Marx, for his own reasons,

ignored foreign trade in his Das Kapital as an important factor of the

national economy. Since then, however, all Communist leaders have

recognized the necessity to trade with foreign countries, and the PRC
is certainly not an exception. If the past is a guide to the future, trade
with the PRC will become more and more a matter of hard bargaining, if and when its national economy becomes stronger. This warning came from Minister of Foreign Trade Yeh Chi-chuang as early
as 1955, when he said:
As to our trade with the United States, although the American Government is determined to cut off Sino-American trade, the American industrial
and commercial communities have constantly kept in touch with our public
and private trade institutions. Quite a few American corporations and
factories have frequently come to talk with us to buy their automobiles,
medicines, electronic equipment, and chemical raw materials. They have
enthusiastically expressed their hope to trade with us. On our part, we
have supported their wishes. Only if there is such a possibility, we are
ready to trade with them . . . Yet, some of the so-called "old hands" in

trade with China are still nostalgic of their status as agents of a suzerain,
though such status will never return to them, and seeking to enjoy privileges in China's foreign trade. Thus, the decline of their trade [with us] is
entirely a problem which they themselves have created; it is by no means
due to our discrimination and exclusion.'8 3
bow their heads to the masses, and make a "confession" in order to win their release.
Washington Post, June 19, 1967, at A16.
152. SNYDER, supra note 119, at 11-12.
153. Yeh Chi-chuang, Consolidation and Development of the PRC's Foreign Trade
Relations, 1 EssAYs 15-19 (1955).
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In a world where power politics is still important, the possibility of

achieving a satisfactory trade relationship with Communist China
still seems remote.

Appendix

TABLE I
PRC's BILATERAL EcoNoMuc TREATIES
AND AGREEMENTS (1949-1964) BY STATE AND SUBJECT #

CLASSIFICATION OF Tm

Sub- Commerce & Economic Aid Trade and, General I Registration
of
Others Total
ject Navigation Loans & Tech. Payments I Delivery
Conditions Trademarks
Cooperation I F
State
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Austria
Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Cambodia
Ceylon
Central
Africa
Congo

(Brazzaville
Cuba
Czecboslovalda
Denmark
Finland
France

1

2
1

Germany

(East)
Germany

(West)
Ghana
Guinea

14
3*
4
2

14

1

10

30
40
5
3
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Sub- Commerce & Economic Aid Trade and General Registration
ject Navigation Loans & Teh. Payments Delivery
of
Others
State
Cooperation
Conditions ITrademarks
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Japan
Korea
(North)
Lebanon
Mali
Mongolia
(Outer)
Nepal
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Poland
Rumania
SingaporeMalaya
Somali
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tunis
United Arab
Republic
(Egypt)
United
Kingdom
U.S.S.R.
1
Vietnam
(North)
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Total
11

1
2

Total

27
5
7
5
11
11
1
2
18
3

1
1

1
1
2
21
27

14

1"
1
2
1
7
1
17

1

1

20

22

3

10
269

88

1

4

1
[6

2
15
27
1
11
408

#Sources: the thirteen volumes of the official collection, TYC, covering the period
1949-1964. Since 1962, the agreements with the Soviet Union have not been listed
in the collection. Even in the earlier period, the collection's report on agreements with
the Soviet Union is incomplete when compared with other sources. See, for example,
SLussER AN TwsKA, A CALENDAR OF Sov=r Ta aA&
s 1917-1957 (1959). The ones
reported by Slusser and Triska but missing from the collection are mostly agreements
concerning Soviet aid, the relinquishment of certain Soviet interests in the PRC, and
technical cooperation.
*Non-governmental agreements.
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TABLE II
EcoNoMIc AGREEMENTS AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL TnEATis
AND AGREEMENTS (1949-1964) BY STATE #

State
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Austria
Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Cambodia
Ceylon
Central Africa
Congo (B.)
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Germany
(East)
Germany
(West)
Ghana
Guinea
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Japan
Korea (North)
Laos
Lebanon
Mali

TotalI Economic
11
22
8
2*
30
31
1
25
20
3
4
11
39
4
2
21
3*

1
14
2
2*
22
9
1
13
13
2
1
3
23
4
0
21
3*

48

30

4*
11
8
40
10
22
6
26*
39
7
1
7

4*
5
3
27
5
7
5
110
11
0
1
2

I7I

State

Mongolia
(Outer)
Morocco
Nepal
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Poland
Rumania
SingaporeMalaya
Somali
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
TanganyikaZanzibar
63 Tunis
United Arab
Republic
100
(Egypt)
45
38 United
Kingdom
68
50 United
Nations
32
83 U.S.A.
42 U.S.S.R.
28 Vietnam
(North)
0
100 Yemen
29 Yugoslavia

I

Total I Economic

I 7

9
64
25
100
73
29
100
52
65
67
25
27
59
100
0
100
100

23

17

74

2

2

100

#Sources: The thirteen volumes of the official collection, TYC, covering the period
1949-1964. The figures of percentage are approximate, not exact.
*Non-govermnental agreements.

